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REFLECTIONS ON THE CHALLENGING
PROLIFERATION OF MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES IN
THE DISTRICT COURT AND THE NEED FOR
JUDICIAL EDUCATION
Honorable Jessie B. Gunther*
I. INTRODUCTION
Maine's courts constantly deal with litigants with mental health issues. His-
torically, our decisions have relied on expert testimony addressing specific issues
of responsibility, risk, and treatment. In recent years, by my observation, court
involvement in the treatment process has increased, but the availability of expert
evidence has decreased.1 Thus, we as judges have become the ultimate decision-
makers regarding litigants' mental health treatment in both criminal and civil con-
texts, without supporting expert testimony. In the face of this development, three
interconnected issues arise.
The first issue is whether judges should even attempt to fill the void caused by
lack of expert testimony. I think all judges would prefer to act only on the basis of
expert information, but, as a practical matter, we cannot. The experts are not avail-
able at the courthouse and we have no choice but to use our own training and
experience by default. 2
The second issue, if judicial training is to compensate for an absence of expert
evidence, is what type and amount of training and education should be required to
achieve competency in this role. Required knowledge should probably include
characteristics of mental disorders, 3 the dynamics of substance abuse and domes-
tic violence, an overview of treatment methods, and the applicability of various
therapies. This list is not exhaustive. Of course, we also need to identify those
areas where an expert remains essential4 and where we should refuse to act on our
own.
The education we receive should be common to all members of the judiciary.
Moreover, those appearing before the court should be informed both of the extent
of our education and how we will use that education in deciding their cases. We
* District Court Judge, Bangor District Court; B.A. Wells College, Aurora, N.Y., 1969; J.D.,
Dickinson School of Law, Carlisle, Pa., 1972. First appointed to the District Court in January
1976 and to the Superior Court in April 1980. Left the judiciary in January 1986, after the birth
of the first of two daughters. Returned to the District Court in September 1990. I would like to
thank Jessica Emmons, Lori Londis, and Laura White for their research and assistance with
both content and presentation.
1. This phenomenon is possibly due to cost factors, pro se litigants, and the pressure to use
less time. These factors are not a subject of this commentary.
2. As an example, I discount arguments that frequent reconciliations disprove domestic vio-
lence. The contrary has been conclusively demonstrated in our judicial training. Cf note 51.
3. See infra Section III.A.
4. A case in which I refused to rely on judicial training, Lapointe v. Lapointe, is on appeal to
the Law Court at this writing. No. BAN-FM-3000-00122 (appeal sent to the Law Court Aug.
12, 2004) (on file with the Maine Law Review). Lapointe v. Lapointe is an annulment case in
which the plaintiff asked me to use my domestic violence training to rebut evidence of condona-
tion. Id.
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must also remain aware that approaches can change. The information judges re-
ceive must be updated regularly.
The third issue raised by the increased role judges are playing in making men-
tal health decisions is the lack of data measuring the efficacy of judicial interven-
tion, as well as the efficacy of the alternative programs to which defendants are
being sentenced. In addition to increased judicial education, courts need to evalu-
ate particular therapeutic programs to determine whether they in fact work. As it
currently stands, we make judgments without much feedback. 5 We need reliable
data, not anecdotal evidence, when deciding whether to send a defendant to an
anger management program, to counseling, or to jail; whether to impose condi-
tions on parent/child contact; or whether to include counseling in a protection from
abuse order.
It. DECISIONS ADDRESSING MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT
Maine's district courts 6 address mental health treatment through civil com-
mitment hearings, 7 protection from abuse cases, 8 bail conditions, 9 conditions of
probation, 10 and the recently enacted administrative release provisions.11 District
court judges are directly responsible for determining competence in criminal and
juvenile proceedings. 12 Specialized courts address drug and alcohol addiction at
both the district and superior court levels. 13 Some examples of the intersection
between legal and mental health considerations are addressed below.
A. Criminal Prosecutions
Prosecutors bring criminal cases in an effort to hold individuals responsible
for their behavior and to prevent future crimes. This task can be more difficult in
cases involving the mentally ill. Legal and medical definitions of mental illness
5. An exception was a presentation at the 2004 Maine Sentencing Institute by Prof. Edward
Latessa of the University of Cincinnati, who pointed out ineffective approaches with low risk
offenders and promoted new approaches in that and other areas.
6. I have used district court examples because of my greater familiarity with that docket. The
superior court has the primary role in criminal cases involving the insanity defense. See ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 39 (West 1983 & Supp. 2003). Probate courts handle guardianships.
See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §§ 5-101 to 5-816 (West 1988 & Supp. 2004).
7. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, §§ 3861-3872 (West 1988 & Supp. 2004).
8. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 4007 (West 1998 & Supp. 2004).
9. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1026 (West 2003). See also L.D. 357 (122nd Legis. 2005).
This bill proposes an amendment to the Maine Bail Code by, in part, "[a]llowing as a condition
of bail that a person enter and remain in a long-term residential facility for substance abuse." Id.
This is in keeping with the trend toward placing the power of making mental health decisions for
defendants in the hands of judges. If this becomes law, it is likely that such conditions would be
imposed by a judge without the benefit of expert testimony.
10. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1204(2)(a)-(d) (West 1983 & Supp. 2003).
11. Id. §§ 1349 to 1349-F (WESTLAW through 2004 Second Special Session of the 121st
Legis.).
12. For competence proceedings involving adults, see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 101-B
(West 2003), and for competence proceedings involving juveniles, see ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 3318 (West 2003).
13. All but one of the drug courts are involved with criminal cases. Judge John Nivison
manages a family drug court in Belfast for child protective cases, which may expand to other
divisions.
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are potentially incongruous, 14 making the task of determining whether a mental
disorder precludes a finding of responsibility very difficult. The criminal process,
from arraignment through post-adjudication, is not well-adapted to treating the
mentally ill, as noted in the following examples.
1. Illustration 1: Responsibility
Prosecutorial decisions in cases involving the mentally ill can be influenced
by pressure from mental health providers. Providers occasionally request criminal
proceedings in an effort to coerce hostile or unmanageable clients into conforming
behavior.15 When legal action is pursued for such purposes, it can generate fa-
cially baffling prosecutions. 16
An example came before me last year. The defendant and another elderly
resident of a boarding home had quarreled over a can of Coke. In the course of the
altercation, the defendant had thrown his walker, and it had grazed the victim, who
was passing by at the time. The case was pursued at the urging of the boarding
home staff, who wanted the defendant to know he could not get away with throw-
ing things at other people. The defendant, however, seemed somewhat out of touch
with the court proceedings. I accepted a negotiated plea of "no contest" and im-
posed a $100 fine paid by his representative payee. The accused was insistent that
he just wanted to pay and go, so I let him, despite my qualms about his mental
capacity.
2. Illustration 2: Bail or Jail
When a defendant with a mental health disorder has been arrested, difficult
release and detention issues may arise when the judge is setting bail. 17 In addition
to the traditional bail requirements, judges have an array of treatment options to
choose from that can be ordered as bail conditioni. The lack of information as to
which bail conditions would be most appropriate in a given circumstance, com-
bined with the previously noted lack of judicial education regarding mental ill-
ness, can hamper sound judicial discretion when a judge is selecting bail condi-
tions.
I have experienced mixed results with bail conditions for treatment. DR 18
had been identified as possibly incompetent through an evaluation conducted at
the jail. I bailed him on charges of violating harassment orders and bail condi-
tions, after a plan was developed through his counsel in consultation with jail per-
14. See Ellen Byers, Mentally Ill Criminal Offenders and the Strict Liability Effect: Is There
Hopefor a Just Jurisprudence in an Era of Responsibility/Consequences Talk?, 57 ARK. L. REV.
447, 455 (2004).
15. I get the sense that providers believe we let offenders hide too much behind their disor-
ders. However, my impression is that the providers usually do not want jail time imposed on
their clients, only the threat of jail. This sends a mixed message to prosecutors and, ultimately,
to judges.
16. In the example that follows, we had a full house for arraignment, and the audience tittered
when the prosecutor described the incident.
17. One concern with imposing bail conditions is that a violation may result in several days
of incarceration. See ME. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1092(A) & (B) (West 2003 & Supp. 2004)
(violation of conditions of release). An individual arrested for violating conditions of release
cannot bail through a bail commissioner. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1095(2) (West 2003).
18. I have omitted case citations and individual names for privacy reasons.
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sonnel. 19 DR was placed in a living situation in the Waterville area that we under-
stood was to be supervised. Unfortunately, however, DR is now among the miss-
ing. A warrant is outstanding for his arrest, despite his questionable competence,
for the original charges and a new charge of violating conditions of release.
By contrast, a continuance without bail but with directions for treatment was
effective with JH. JH was discharged from the Bangor Mental Health Institute
(BMHI) after two months of involuntary commitment, only to face a charge of
assault that arose at the time of his admission to BMHI, when he hit a nurse in the
Eastern Maine Medical Center examining room. The initial Title 15 evaluation,
done while he was hospitalized, found incompetence. 20 Before the second stage
evaluation, 2 1 the attorneys and JH's caseworker negotiated a continuance. Even-
tually, the case was dismissed by the prosecutor after community support services
had been successful in maintaining JH for six months.
3. Illustration 3: Post-Adjudication
Historically, courts have utilized probation to achieve compliance with men-
tal health treatment conditions following conviction. 22 In 2003, the Maine Legis-
lature supplemented the courts' options for mandating mental health services by
adding the administrative release provision to Maine's Criminal Code.23 An ex-
ample of the courts' ability to mandate such services can be found in paragraph 16
of the current probation form and paragraph 7 of the administrative release form:
[C]omplete (evaluation and) counseling and treatment as an (outpatient/inpatient)
(at _ or a similar facility) as directed by [your probation officer]
for (substance abuse) (sexual offender) (psychological) (domestic abuse) (certi-
fied batterer's intervention) (anger management) (medical)
issues and sign any releases .... 24
The court has the option of revoking probation for failure to comply with
treatment conditions, although that option is often not exercised. For example, JM
was a probationer residing in a boarding home maintained by his mental health
19. A number of jails are associated with various types of projects that develop pretrial re-
lease plans. Volunteers of America covers the Penobscot County Jail.
20. Counsel from the commitment hearing was appointed to defend the criminal action, and
was able to obtain evaluation during hospitalization. See ME. Rav. STAT. AN. tit. 15, § 101-B(t)
(West 2003) (authorizing the district court to order a defendant to participate in a mental health
evaluation to determine competency to stand trial). This was fortunate, as, generally speaking,
getting an unstable defendant and the evaluator together can be a difficult task.
21. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 10l-B(2) (West 2003) (requiring a mandatory follow-up
examination if the preliminary examination showed the defendant may suffer from a mental
disease or defect or if further observation is required).
22. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1204(2-A) (West 1983 & Supp. 2003). Subsection 4 of
§ 1204 authorizes referral for evaluation to the Department of Behavioral and Developmental
Services for an assessment of a probation condition requiring psychiatric treatment or counsel-
ing. It requires notice to the Department when treatment or counseling is ordered. This provi-
sion, which has been in existence since 1997, is rarely used, in my experience. It is not in-
corporated in the administrative release provision of ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1349, et
seq. (West Supp. 2004).
23. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1349-C (West Supp. 2004).
24. District Court Probation Form CR-1223, Rev. 10/03; District Court Administrative Re-
lease Form CR- 113, Rev. 7/04.
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service provider.25 The home was designed specifically for JM, but contained
other residents as well. JM had faced multiple prosecutions for assault and threats
directed at staff and fellow residents2 6 and was placed on probation after several
convictions in 2003. The conditions required him to "[flollow treatment recom-
mendations, including MEDICATION compliance, of treating MH workers." JM's
probation was revoked last summer after three new assault convictions.2 7 With
individuals as mentally ill as JM, new criminal conduct is usually the key to revo-
cation. In contrast, revocation is often sought for the failure to pursue substance
abuse, sexual offender, or batterer's intervention counseling, which courts may
perceive as more in the control of the offender.
B. Civil Proceedings: Family Matters
Maine statutes governing protection from abuse cases 28 and parent-child con-
tact in cases of domestic abuse 29 explicitly authorize the court to mandate mental
health services. Judges are also becoming increasingly involved as managers in
child protection cases. 30 After a child is removed from a home, the parents and
the Department of Health & Human Services (DHHS) are responsible for develop-
ing and pursuing a reunification plan;3 1 reunification plans almost always include
mental health treatment. Resolution of the mental disorder is not the goal of the
protective proceeding, however. The aim of the proceeding is to resolve the legal
issue of whether the child is in jeopardy, and the two may not be the same. 32
Mental illness in and of itself does not preclude being a competent parent.
In parental rights cases, courts are also confronted with the task of determin-
ing if any risk of harm to a child arises from a parent's mental or emotional condi-
tion. Pretrial motions may be filed to compel disclosure of mental health treat-
ment, usually opposed by the party whose records are sought. 33 Evaluation may
25. State v. JM, No. BAN-CR-03-568 (Bang. Dist. Ct. Mar. 14, 2003) (docket on file with the
Maine Law Review).
26. In a demonstration of unintended consequences, a bail condition of no contact with a co-
resident victim resulted in the victim being removed from the home, not the defendant.
27. Probation imposed in BAN-CR-03-568 (conviction of assault, 3/14/03), revoked as to
three days, 8/28/03 (new conviction, criminal threatening, BAN-CR-03-2454; other charges
BAN-CR-03-2309, criminal mischief, and BAN-CR-03-3467, criminal threatening, dismissed);
revoked as to seven days, 12/5/03, concurrent with assault conviction, BAN-CR-03-457 1. JM
also served three days in October 2003 for criminal threatening and terrorizing, without revoca-
tion.
28. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 4007(1)(H) (West 1998).
29. See id. § 1653(6)(B)(3).
30. The June 14, 2004 judicial education presentation, "Child Protection Matters-Partner-
ship for Permanency," presented by Judge Nancy S. Salyers of Chicago, advocated active judi-
cial monitoring of theses cases. Nancy S. Salyers, Presentation at a Child Protection Training
Session, Bangor, Maine (June 14, 2004).
31. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4041 (West 2005). A reunification plan sets specific goals
that the parent(s) must accomplish for reunification, usually accompanied by a statement of
services to be provided. The recent case of In re Jazmine L., 2004 ME 125, 861 A.2d 1277,
notes the problem of plans not changing with changed circumstances.
32. See, e.g., In re Jazmine L., 2004 ME 125,861 A.2d 1277; In re Dakota P., 2005 ME 2,86
A.2d 280.
33. ME. R. Civ. P 35(a). Maintaining a level of privacy presents problems when opposing
parties receive copies of each other's mental health evaluations. Ten years ago I had a case, VL
v. KL, in which a child protective evaluation of the father was widely circulated by the mother in
their subsequent divorce. Any discovery or evaluation order should include a non-disclosure
provision.
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be requested separately or through appointment of a guardian ad litem. 34 If a
parent has a mental disorder, ongoing judicial monitoring may become an issue for
the final decree. 35 I am reluctant to stay involved in parental rights cases post-
judgment, but I have required a parent to sign a release so that the other parent can
confirm continuing therapy or medication compliance as a condition of allowing
visitation. 36 If the parties agree to judicial monitoring, I have continued the
guardian's role or appointed a Special Master to manage visitation and other dis-
putes.37
M. EXPERTISE OR EVIDENCE ON MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES
Aberrant behavior may not be the result of a mental disorder,38 although the
untrained observer may assume that it is. Diagnosing is as much an art as a science
and does not have the certainty legal minds prefer, as noted in the section that
follows.
A. A Primer on Mental Disorders
The common medical authority for identifying mental disorders is the Diag-
nostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR), now in its fourth
edition. 39 The DSM-IV-TR is organized into five categories, Axis I through Axis
V.40 Most judges have generalized knowledge of the conditions described in Axis
34. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1507(3)(B)(4) (West 2004). Most guardian ad litem
motions are, however, addressed by the case management officers. ME. FAM. R. III(A)(1). No
legal standard exists for the mental health evaluations, and often the results are presented sec-
ond-hand through the guardian's report. The recent case of In re Guardianship of K-M, 2005
ME 8, 866 A.2d 106, provides an excellent discussion of ordering an examination in a guardian-
ship case.
35. In the divorce of JM v. KM, the guardian ad litem recommended that the divorce decree
mandate post-judgment psychological evaluation of the father, with five particular tests, includ-
ing the Hare Psychopathy checklist (not a universally accepted tool), prior to parent-child con-
tacts. No. BAN-FM-02-19 (Bangor Dist. Ct. May 17, 2004) (on file with the Maine Law Re-
view).
36. TS v. NT, No. BAN-FM-99-179 (Bangor Dist. Ct., pending request for further modifica-
tion).
37. NB v. CC, No. BAN-DV-96-329 (Bangor Dist. Ct. Feb. 17, 2005).
38. See DIAONOSTIC AND STATISTicAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISOaDERS, AMERICAN PSYCHAmIC
AsSOCiAMON xxxi (4th ed., text revision, 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR]. According to the
DSM-IV-TR:
[E]ach of the mental disorders is conceptualized as a clinically significant behavioral
or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in an individual and that is associ-
ated with present distress (e.g., a painful symptom) or disability (i.e., impairment in
one or more important areas of functioning) or with a significantly increased risk of
suffering death, pain, disability or important loss of freedom. In addition, this syn-
drome or pattern must not be merely an expectable and culturally sanctioned response
to a particular event, for example, the death of a loved one. Whatever its original
cause, it must currently be considered a manifestation of a behavioral, psychological,
or biological dysfunction in the individual. Neither deviant behavior (e.g., political,
religious, or sexual) nor conflicts that are primarily between the individual and soci-
ety are mental disorders unless the deviance or conflict is a symptom of dysfunction in
the individual, as described above.
Id. (emphasis added).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 27-37.
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I, such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and major depression. District court
judges frequently hear testimony regarding conditions described in Axis II, which
covers personality disorders and mental retardation,4 1 because personality disor-
ders are common components in allegations of jeopardy. Personality disorders are
fixed, maladaptive patterns of behavior that are very difficult to treat. Medication
is largely an ineffective means of treating a personality disorder, although it may
relieve some symptoms.42 Furthermore, not all individuals with the same mental
health diagnosis have the same characteristics, and, conversely, symptoms often
overlap. 43
Perhaps the most famous legal construct related to mental disorders is the
legal definition of insanity. The term "insanity," however, is nowhere to be found
in the index of the DSM-IV-TR. 44 The exculpatory defense of insanity originated
in M'Naghten's Case.45 The House of Lords articulated the first modern concept
of legal insanity as follows:
To establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at
the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such
a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality
of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing
what was wrong. 4 6
The legal standard for insanity has undergone a variety of revisions since the
M'Naghten test, including the "irresistible impulse" test, the Durham test, and
most recently the test of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code section
4.01. 4 7 The Model Penal Code's broader formulation of insanity enables the jury
41. Id. at 28-29. The DSM-IV-TR describes a personality disorder as "an enduring pattern of
inner experience and behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of the individual's
culture, is pervasive and inflexible, has an onset in adolescence or early adulthood, is stable over
time, and leads to distress or impairment." Id. at 685. The DSM-IV-TR furthermore notes that
"[o]nly when personality traits are inflexible and maladaptive and cause significant functional
impairment or subjective distress do they constitute Personality Disorders." Id. at 686. The
remaining categories in the DSM-IV-TR include Axis III, medical conditions, Axis IV, psycho-
social and environmental stressors, and Axis V, the Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF)
Scale. Id. at 29-34.
42. Enough experts have testified to these propositions in my courtroom that I accept them as
true. The experts include John Lorenz, Ph.D., Diane Tennies, Ph.D., David Booth, Ph.D., Jonathan
Siegel, Ph.D., and Bruce Saunders, Ph.D. I have never had an expert testify to the contrary.
43. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 38, at xxxi. When several core features of a particular diagnosis
present themselves, but individual characteristics do not give rise to any one subcategory, a
description of "NOS," meaning "Not Otherwise Specified," is given. A diagnosis followed by
"NOS" does not put the principal diagnosis in doubt. For first commitments, where diagnoses
are still being refined when involuntary commitment hearings are held, we often see "Psychotic
Disorder NOS" rather than depression, schizoaffective disorder, or bipolar disorder. See id. at
343.
44. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 38, at 937.
45. 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
46. Timothy S. Hall, Mental Status and Criminal Culpability after Atkins v. Virginia, 29 U.
DAYTON L. REv. 355, 356 (2004) (quoting M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718,722 (H.L. 1843)).
47. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 619-26 (3d ed. 2003).
Section 4.01 of the Model Penal Code, titled "Mental Disease or Defect Excluding Responsibil-
ity," provides as follows:
(I) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such con-
duct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity
either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to con-
form his conduct to the requirements of law.
[Vol. 57:2
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to consider both the volitional and the cognitive impairments of the defendant. 48
States may vary, of course, in their individual definitions and "tests" to arrive
at a legal standard for insanity. Maine statutes establish that "mental disease or
defect" means:
[o]nly those severely abnormal mental conditions that grossly and demonstrably
impair a person's perception or understanding of reality. An abnormality mani-
fested only by repeated criminal conduct or excessive use of alcohol, drugs, or
similar substances, in and of itself, does not constitute a mental disease or de-
fect.49
The State of Maine provides other "legal" definitions relating to mental disor-
ders, such as the civil commitment statute, which defines a "mentally ill person" as
"a person having a psychiatric or other disease which substantially impairs his
mental health, including persons suffering from the effects of the use of drugs,
narcotics, hallucinogens or intoxicants, including alcohol, but not including men-
tally retarded or sociopathic persons. '50 More statutory guidance can be found in
a definition of "psychotic condition" from the Interstate Compact on Mental Health,
adopted by Maine in 1993:
"Psychotic condition" means any disease, illness or condition commonly referred
to by the medical profession ... as any disorder characterized by psychotic ten-
dencies or manic-depressive behavior or schizophrenia or other similar condition
that, without the administration of medical treatment, including the use of psy-
chotropic drugs, would constitute a danger to the patient or to others and would
result in a patient being gravely disabled.5 1
B. Judicial Education
Judicial education in Maine regarding mental health issues and the efficacy of
alternative treatment programs is presently haphazard. As noted, judges absorb"expertise" in child protective hearings, sentencing hearings, and during family
matters cases involving parenting disputes. After enough professionals have said
the same thing about a given disorder, or about best parenting practices, the infor-
mation becomes part of the judge's background knowledge-a form of on-the-job
training. Additionally, with the possible exception of the newest judges, all Maine
judges have had some domestic violence training. 52 Many judges have had train-
(2) As used in this Article, the terms "mental disease or defect" do not include
an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antiso-
cial conduct.
Id. at 1012.
48. Id. at 623.
49. ME. REV. STAT. ANm. tit. 17-A, § 39(2) (West Supp. 2003).
50. ME. Rav. STAT, ANN. tit. 34-B, § 3801(5) (West 1988). Robert Gallon, Ph.D., who does
examinations for BMHI commitments, and I have discussed informally the unhelpfulness of the
word "sociopathic," which is not a DSM-IV-TR construct. My impression is that the statute
intends to exclude personality disorders, but I have not had to rule directly on that point.
51. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, § l1001(1)(H) (West 2004).
52. For example, a comprehensive session was held in September 2001 entitled "Enhancing
Judicial Skills in Domestic Violence Cases." Breakout sessions included: "Observations and
Commentary Regarding Victim and Perpetrator Behavior" and "Fact-Finding: How to Get the
Right Information." The subtitle of the session indicated that faculty would also review factors
considered to be important indicators of dangerousness or lethality. An earlier training provided
a publication of the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts, "Domestic Violence Visita-
tion Risk Assessment," published, I believe, in 1999.
20051
ing on substance abuse,53 including all of the juvenile drug court judges, who met
for multi-day training sessions when the juvenile drug courts were introduced in
1999. 54 Finally, most Maine judges have attended sessions on the effects of trauma
on children.
Nonetheless, the group training opportunities for Maine judges are limited,
with many topics fighting for consideration. 55 Although individual judges attend
programs addressing different aspects of mental health pathology and treatment
and file reports, no regular programs on the subject of mental health issues are
scheduled.5 6 Thus, with the exception of domestic violence training and some
issues regarding substance abuse, no common background exists among judges in
Maine regarding mental health disorders or the efficacy of alternative treatment
plans. 57
This kind of judicial education-picked up through listening to expert testi-
mony and scattered conferences and presentations-has its dangers. Moreover, it
fails to provide all judges with the same background and does not ensure that their
education is of the highest quality and derived from the latest data.58 This creates
the risk that litigants will be treated inconsistently, and it threatens the integrity of
the system as a whole. Another danger lies in the fact that such training tends to be
53. For example, between September 20 and 23, 2004, Justice Andrew Mead attended a
National Judicial College course on "Co-Occurring Substance Abuse and Mental Disorders,"
and later filed a report. See infra note 55.
54. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3312(3)(A)(4) (West 2003).
55. At our most recent education program, the Tri-State Conference, March 16-18, 2005,
held with judges from Vermont and New Hampshire, the focus was on high-conflict divorces
(including those involving mental health issues), with other topics on child support, juvenile
drug issues, business valuations, and tax issues in divorce.
56. Reports of seminars are circulated through the Judicial Education Committee, which
Justice Paul Rudman chaired until very recently. This office maintains information on each
judge's particular CJE.
57. In addition to expert testimony, the case management officers (CMOs) have materials on
the developmental stages of children, which they have passed on to judges somewhat randomly.
For example, CMO Jordan gave me a very helpful "Developmental Table of Children's Experi-
ence of Divorce," which cites the following sources: James Bray, Psychosocial Factors Affect-
ing Custodial and Visitation Arrangements, 9 BEH. Sc. & L. 419 (1991); WILLIAM F. HODGES,
INTERVENTIONS FOR CHILDREN OF DIVORCE: CUSTODY, ACCESS, AND PSYCHOTHERAPY (John Wiley &
Sons, Inc. 1986); JUDrrH WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN,
AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE (Tickner & Fields 1990); JUDITH WALLERSTEIN & JOAN
BERLIN KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: How PARENTS AND CHILDREN COPE WITH DIVORCE (Basic
Books 1980). I do not know where the table itself came from. It includes reactions, common
problems, prevention, and recommended custody/visitation arrangements for various age groups.
58. By contrast, some states have set up coordinating commissions for judicial education to
address and coordinate judicial education on all issues, including issues of mental health. See,
e.g., The Coordinating Commission for Judicial Department Education, available at http://
www.courts.mo.gov/osca/index.nsf/0689b8c 101eb734c86256555007e 179d/58c3056d6b8c
693d86256e8c00750a25?OpenDocument (last accessed Apr. 10, 2005). Other states have be-
gun publishing newsletters for judges and have set up hotlines that judges can call for informa-
tion about psychiatric disorders, the availability of local mental health services, and other top-
ics. See, e.g., Liz Lipton, Judges Educate Colleagues About Mental Illness, 37(9) PSYCHIATRIC
NEWS 8 (May 3, 2002) available at http:llpn.psychiatryonline.orglcgilcontent/fulll37/9/8 (refer-
encing the efforts of the Law and Psychiatry Institute of the North Shore-Long Island Jewish
Health System in New York State to provide these services to judicial officers financed in part
by a grant from the New York legislature). [The author is particularly indebted to the Law
Review staff, as previously noted, for this information, and for that in the following two notes.]
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invisible to the litigants and off the record. Ongoing training and education for
judges is critical if we are to avoid these dangers and succeed in this new judicial
role, a role that enables and sometimes requires us to order individuals to attend
counseling or alternative treatment programs. 59
Whatever the training, judicial education must still defer to any available ex-
pert evidence. The modest knowledge that might come from our limited education
must always yield to qualified testimony.
IV. CONCLUSION: IMPROVING THE WORK PRODUCT
Our current caseload requires greater familiarity with definitions of mental
disorders, the available modes of treatment, and the professionals who administer
them. To effectively administer this caseload and the increasing demands placed
on judges to order therapeutic measures for partners, parents, and criminal offend-
ers, we need a common education. That education should include information
about the following:
" mental disorders as medicine defines them and the law
accounts for them;
" substance abuse and its interaction with mental health and
legal issues;
" the developmental needs of children and their significance in
the law;
59. In its discussion of "problem-solving courts," a report published by the National Center
for State Courts cites "ongoing training and education for judge and staff in domestic violence
dynamics" as a key component of successful domestic violence courts; similarly, it cites "con-
tinuing interdisciplinary education" as critical to the success of drug courts. PAMELA M. CASEY
& DAVID B. ROTrMAN, PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS: MODELS AND TRENDS 4-7 (National Center for
State Courts, 2003). Although my discussion is not confined to Maine's specialty or problem-
solving courts, the importance of judicial education regarding broader, psychosocial concerns of
defendants in any type of hearing or court proceeding remains.
The rise in judicial intervention in mental health areas has to some extent coincided with the
emergence over the past decade of problem-solving courts and the concept of "therapeutic jus-
tice." See id.; see generally JUDONG IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND THE
COURTS (Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler eds., 2003); The Honorable Gerald W. Hardcastle,
Adversarialism and the Family Court: A Family Court Judge's Perspective, 9 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv.
L. & PoL'Y 57 (2005). Indeed, national institutions such as the Conference of Chief Justices and
the Conference of State Court Administrators have embraced problem-solving courts as a prom-
ising way to resolve disputes involving "psychosocial problems as well as legal issues." CASEY
& ROTTMAN, supra, at 1. In fact, the Maine Judicial Branch is in the process of adding behav-
ioral/mental health courts to its roster of specialized courts as a way of addressing the preva-
lence of mental health issues in criminal cases. CRIME & JusTICE DATA BOOK, 2004 MAINE CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE COMMISSION & MAINE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS CENTER 3-6. The Crime & Justice Data
Book is an annual publication of the Maine Criminal Justice Commission that compiles statistics
and data for the stated purpose of keeping governmental entities abreast of trends and existing
conditions in the criminal justice system. Id. See also ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 3358(1)
(West 1999) (establishing the Maine Criminal Justice Commission and charging it with the task
of "monitor[ing] and evaluat[ing] the State's criminal justice system on an ongoing basis and..
.provid[ing] recommendations regarding changes in that system to the appropriate state depart-
ments and the Legislature"). Given the national trend toward increasing the number of problem-
solving courts, a trend replicated here in Maine, it is imperative that judges be properly, uni-
formly, and consistently educated, and that reliable studies be conducted on the efficacy of all
court-ordered mental health treatment and other alternative treatment programs.
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m issues of anger and domestic violence and their relationship to
the law; and
m the efficacy of alternative treatment programs and mental
health intervention. 60
This curriculum should also be summarized and made available to litigants, so that
they can anticipate where judicial familiarity with a subject can be assumed (or
perhaps needs to be contradicted).
Judges should also have some grasp of the role of the various professionals
and experts mentioned in the statutes who work in the field: psychiatrists, who are
medical doctors; 6 1 psychologists and psychological examiners; 62 substance abuse
counselors, including alcohol and drug counseling aides, certified drug and alco-
hol counselors, and licensed alcohol and drug counselors; 6 3 social workers, in-
cluding licensed clinical social workers, licensed master social workers, and li-
censed social workers; 64 and professional counselors, including licensed profes-
sional counselors and licensed clinical professional counselors. 65 Not all may
qualify as "experts" all of the time under the statutes, and judges should be kept
abreast of which specialists qualify as experts in which contexts.
This judicial education should be regularly updated, and a committee or task
force should be charged with reviewing data on the effectiveness of various modes
of treatment ordered by the courts. 6 6 Judges should be kept informed of what
works and what does not. The ultimate objective of the training is to help us
understand the evidence we receive and its legal significance. It should not be the
evidence itself. We need to stay humble and know our limitations. Our field is
law, not medicine or social work. We will do best when litigants bring the evi-
dence in, without expecting us to supply it.
60. There does appear to be some movement in this direction. In its latest report, the Maine
Criminal Justice Commission indicated its intention to keep track of the impact problem-solving
courts are having on the administration of justice: "Problem-solving courts offer the Judiciary a
new model to complement their overall system. Over time, this annual report intends to track
and monitor the number of cases entering. these courts, and the impact they are having on.the
overall system." CRIME & Jus-ncF DATA BOOK, supra note 58, at 3-6. This is a laudatory goal, but
data also needs to be gathered across the spectrum of cases-not just in the specialized, prob-
lem-solving courts-to determine the efficacy of mental health treatment in different contexts.
61. WEBSTFRS I1 NEw COLLEGE DICTIONARY 893 (1999). For physician licensing, see ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 3270, et seq. (West 1999).
62. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 3811 (West 1999).
63. See id. § 6203.
64. See id. § 7001 -A.
65. See id. § 13858.
66. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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